The European Union’s decision-making process is a delicate balance between supranational integration and intergovernmental sovereignty. At the heart of this balance lies the veto power, the ability of any single member state to block decisions in areas where the EU treaties require unanimity rather than qualified majority voting. While 80% of EU legislation is adopted by qualified majority, unanimity remains the rule in foreign and security policy, defence, enlargement, treaty changes, and parts of the EU budget.
The veto power was designed to protect national interests and ensure that no member state is forced into decisions that conflict with its constitutional identity. However, its use has evolved from a safeguard of sovereignty into a tool of strategic leverage, often employed to extract concessions or signal domestic political strength. This trend has intensified since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, with member states increasingly using their veto to block sanctions, aid packages, and other critical EU actions.
The Rising Trend of Veto Use: Data and Patterns
48 vetoes have been exercised in the European Council since the EU’s inception, with a sharp increase in recent years. Hungary is the most frequent user, with 21 vetoes, followed by Poland (7), Greece, the Netherlands, and Austria (2 each). Other member states, such as Cyprus, Romania, and Bulgaria, have used their veto at least once. Recent examples include:
- Hungary’s veto of a €90bn aid package for Ukraine (March 2026).
- Hungary and Slovakia blocking new EU sanctions on Russia (June 2025).
- Hungary’s repeated obstruction of sanctions and aid related to Ukraine, often linked to disputes over frozen EU funds and rule-of-law conditionality.
Vetoes are most commonly used in foreign policy (e.g., sanctions on Russia, Israel, or other third countries), but also budgetary decisions (e.g., aid packages, financial assistance), enlargement steps (e.g., accession negotiations) and defence and security (e.g., military aid, defence modernization).
Consequences of the Veto Power
- A single veto can block entire EU actions, leading to delayed or watered-down responses to crises. This was evident in the EU’s struggle to adopt timely sanctions against Russia or provide cohesive support to Ukraine. In this way the unanimity requirement slows down the EU’s ability to act as a unified geopolitical actor, weakening its credibility on the global stage and allowing other powers (e.g., China, Russia) to exploit divisions.
- Member states increasingly use their veto not just to protect national interests, but as a bargaining chip to extract unrelated concessions (e.g., Hungary’s linkage of Ukraine aid to disputes over EU funds). This “blackmail” dynamic undermines the EU’s cohesion and erodes trust among member states. As Patrick Müller (University of Vienna) notes, “Hungary tries to veil this link… it gives the illusion that these things are about foreign policy. One could just call it blackmail or hard bargaining”. Vetoes are also politicized domestically, with governments using them to signal defiance against “Brussels” and appeal to nationalistic electorates, especially ahead of elections.
- The fragmented responses to major crises (e.g., Ukraine war, migration, climate) weaken the EU’s negotiating power and allow third countries to exploit divisions. The lack of consensus on foreign policy and defence undermines the EU’s ambition to be a global leader in human rights, climate action, and security.
The Case for Reform: Removing the Veto in the Council
The EU faces growing challenges from authoritarian regimes, climate change, and economic instability. Unanimity is no longer fit for purpose in a world where geopolitical challenges are requiring rapid, decisive action. While unanimity ensures that all voices are heard, it disproportionately empowers individual member states to block progress supported by the majority. This is undermining the principle of representative democracy and democratic legitimacy. At the same time as the EU risks permanent gridlock if vetoes continue to be used strategically. As Thu Nguyen (Jacques Delors Centre) states, “The big problem that the EU has with unanimity is that you can only get rid of unanimity with unanimity”.
Existing Workarounds and Their Limits
The EU has explored several informal and formal mechanisms to bypass vetoes, but each has limitations:
| Mechanism | Description | Limitations |
| Political isolation | Other member states coordinate to pressure or sideline the vetoing country. | Requires high-level coordination; may not be sustainable long-term. |
| Bridging clauses | Allow the European Council to switch to qualified majority voting. | Requires unanimous agreement to activate, including from the vetoing state. |
| Article 7 | Suspends voting rights of a member state for breaching EU values. | Requires near-unanimity (excluding the state in question); politically difficult. |
| Financial pressure | Links EU funds to rule-of-law compliance. | Controversial; risks backlash from sovereignty-focused states. |
| “Coffee break” method | Vetoing state leaves the room, allowing others to proceed. | Relies on voluntary cooperation from the vetoing state. 36-2 |
Proposed Reforms: Toward Qualified Majority Voting (QMV)
Option 1: Expand QMV to New Policy Areas
- Proposal: Extend qualified majority voting to foreign policy, defence, and budgetary decisions, as suggested by French President Emmanuel Macron in 2022.
- Benefits:
- Faster decision-making and greater agility in crises.
- Reduces the risk of blackmail by individual member states.
- Challenges:
- Requires treaty reform, which itself requires unanimity.
- Smaller or sovereignty-focused states are likely to resist, fearing a loss of influence.
Option 2: Abolish Vetoes for Specific Policies
- Proposal: Remove vetoes in time-sensitive or high-stakes areas (e.g., sanctions, emergency aid, enlargement).
- Implementation:
- Use bridging clauses in the Lisbon Treaty to switch to QMV in specific areas.
- Phase out unanimity gradually, starting with less controversial policy fields.
- Obstacles:
- All member states must agree to the change, including those most likely to use vetoes.
- Risk of opt-outs: Some states may demand exemptions, fragmenting EU policies further.
Option 3: Strengthen Safeguards Against Abuse
- Proposal: Introduce formal safeguards to prevent the strategic use of vetoes, such as:
- Supermajority override: Allow a two-thirds majority to override a veto in exceptional cases.
- Transparency requirements: Mandate that member states publicly justify their vetoes and demonstrate a direct link to national constitutional interests.
- Time limits: Impose deadlines for veto considerations to prevent indefinite blockages.
- Benefits:
- Reduces arbitrary use of vetoes while preserving member state sovereignty.
- Encourages compromise by raising the political cost of obstruction.
- Challenges:
- Enforcement: Requires strong political will and may still face resistance from veto-prone states.
Option 4: Enhanced Cooperation and Flexible Integration
- Proposal: Allow groups of member states to proceed with policies (e.g., defence, sanctions) without requiring unanimity from all 27.
- Implementation:
- Use existing enhanced cooperation mechanisms (Article 20 TEU) more aggressively.
- Create “coalitions of the willing” for specific policies, with opt-outs for dissenting states.
- Benefits:
- Avoids gridlock by enabling progress without full consensus.
- Preserves sovereignty for states that wish to opt out.
- Challenges:
- Fragmentation: Could lead to a multi-speed EU, with varying levels of integration.
- Inequality: Smaller states may feel marginalized if excluded from key initiatives.
The core irony of veto reform is that unanimity is required to abolish unanimity. This creates a catch-22: the states most likely to block reform are the ones whose cooperation is needed to implement it. As Thu Nguyen notes, “Everyone must agree to get rid of it”.
Conclusion: The Veto Trap and the Future of the EU
The EU’s veto power was designed to protect sovereignty, but it has increasingly become a tool of obstruction, threatening the Union’s ability to act decisively in a rapidly changing world. The consequences we have experienced in recent years are gridlock, weakened credibility, and strategic exploitation by member states and this is unsustainable in the long term. The regime change in Hungary significantly improves the conditions for reform. At the same time, such reform is urgent. The most plausible way forward combines: a gradual expansion of qualified majority in less controversial areas, stronger safeguards against veto abuse (e.g. transparency, overriding supermajority), increased cooperation for willing Member States, public and political pressure to marginalize obstructive behavior. However, the most effective proposal remains President Macron’s to abolish the veto in all essential areas through treaty reform.
The alternative of doing nothing risks a permanent state of paralysis, where the EU is unable to respond to crises or compete with global powers. As Antonio Costa, President of the European Council, warned: “No one can blackmail the European Institutions”. The time to act is now.
Written By
LarsGoran Bostrom
Expert of Data Ethics and Developer/Author of the Course: Data Ethics – Navigating the Ethical Landscape of Emerging Technologies and helping businesses and other organisations to Re-Digitalise with European Products and Services
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